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BLOWING HOT AND COLD AT THE SAME TIME:
SECTION 1034 ROLLOVER AND RENTAL DEDUCTIONS
ON RENTAL AND SALE OF PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE
Congress enacted section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to pro-
tect a taxpayer's investment in his home.' Section 1034 provides for the
nonrecognition' of any gain realized 3 from the sale of a taxpayer's principal
residence4 that the taxpayer applies to the purchase of a new principal residence
I. I.R.C. § 1034 (West 1984); see H.R. RPP. No. 586, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 28, reprinted
in 1951-2 C.B. 357, 377 [hereinafter cited as H.R. RPs. No. 586]; S. REP. No. 781 (Part 2),
82d Cong., Ist Sess. 36, reprinted in 1951-2 C.B. 458, 482-83 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
781]. Congress passed § 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to relieve the hardships on
taxpayers who move or change residences and sell their old residences at a gain. See H.R. Rap.
No. 586, supra, at 377; S. REP. No. 781, supra, at 482. Congress determined that taking the
gain a taxpayer realizes when he sells his residence may be especially burdensome when the tax-
payer must move because of a change in employment or an increase in the size of the taxpayer's
family. See H. R. RaP. No. 586, supra, at 377; S. REP. No. 781, supra, at 482. Consequently,
Congress passed IRC § 1034 which allows a taxpayer to defer recognition of gain realized from
the sale of a taxpayer's principal residence provided the taxpayer applies the gain to the purchase
of a new principal residence within two years.
2. See I.R.C. § 1034(a) (,Vest 1984) (taxpayer does not recognize gain realized from sale
of principal residence to extent taxpayer applies gain to purchase of new principal residence).
Section 1034 provides that a taxpayer must include as income gain realized from the sale of the
taxpayer's old principal residence oftly to the extent that the adjusted sales price of the old prin-
cipal residence exceeds the purchase price of the new principal residence. Id.; see Occhipinti,
28 TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 978, 983 (1969) (IRS required recognition of gain realized from
sale of taxpayer's old principal residence because total gain realized was less than amount by
which adjusted sales price of old residence exceeded purchase price of new residence). The adjusted
sales price of a residence is the value of the money or property that the taxpayer received for
the residence less any expenses the taxpayer incurred while preparing the residence for sale. See
I.R.C. § 1034(b) (West 1984); see also Cramer v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1125, 1132 (1971) (tax-
payer could deduct costs of painting and repairing residence before sale from amount taxpayer
received from sale of residence to determine adjusted sales price or residence). Any gain realized
from the sale of a taxpayer's principal residence that does not fall within § 1034's nonrecognition
provision is capital gain that the taxpayer must report as income. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (West
1984) (taxpayer's gross income includes gain taxpayer made from dealings in property); id. §
1202 (taxpayer may deduct from gross income 60% of taxpayer's net capital gain); infra note
3 (determination of gain realized from sale of property); infra note 6 (rollover of nonrecognized
gain into basis of new principal residence).
3. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1984). When a taxpayer sells or exchanges property, the
gain realized from the sale or exchange of the property is the amount realized from the sale
or exchange minus the adjusted basis for the property. Id. The amount realized from the sale
or exchange of property is the total value of the money or property which the taxpayer receives
in the sale or exchange. Id. § 1001(b). The adjusted basis for the property is the basis of the
property less adjustments provided under § 1016. See id. § 1012 (basis of property is cost of
property to taxpayer); id. § 1016 (items taxpayer must subtract from basis in determining adjusted
basis for property).
4. See Jacobs v. United states, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9120, at 94,571 (D. Minn.
1964). The court in Jacobs v. United States stated that a principal residence under § 1034 is
the main residence where a taxpayer actually resides. Id.; see Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.
345, 351 (1963) (courts should apply ordinary meaning to terms "use," "principal" and "residence"
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within two years of the date of sale of the old residence.' The IRC terms
section 1034's nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale of a taxpayer's
principal residence as a "rollover" because section 1034 enables a taxpayer
to continue his investment by applying the gain to the purchase of a new prin-
cipal residence., Although taxpayers who use residential property as a prin-
cipal residence may claim section 1034 rollover of the gain realized from the
sale of the property, taxpayers who use residential property in an activity for
the production of income may claim deductions for expenses resulting from
the activity.7 Courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally view
rental of residential property as use of the residence for the production of
income." Deductions associated with the rental of a residence typically include
in § 1034). For a residence to qualify as a taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034, a taxpayer
must use the residence habitually as his principal residence. See Friedman v. Commissioner, 43
TAx CT. MEm. DEC. (CCH) 1009, 1013 (1982) (court held residence that taxpayer occupied during
summer months of year was summer residence and not taxpayer's principal residence); infra notes
21-28 and accompanying text (determination of principal residence status under § 1034).
5. I.R.C. § 1034 (West 1984).
6. Id. A taxpayer "rolls-over" the gain realized from the sale of his old principal residence
by subtracting the amount of the nonrecognized gain from the basis of the new principal residence.
Id. § 1034(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(e) (1956). Should a taxpayer later sell his new residence
at a gain, the § 1034 reduction in the basis of the new residence will reflect the unrecognized
gain from the old residence when the taxpayer computes and pays taxes on the gain realized
from the sale of the new residence. See I.R.C. § 1016(7) (West 1984) (taxpayer shall deduct from
basis of residence any gain not recognized under § 1034 for sale of taxpayer's previous residence).
7. See I.R.C. § 212 (West 1984) (taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses
attributable to management, conservation, or maintenance of property which taxpayer holds for
production of income); see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 772, 778-79 (D. Del. 1968)
(taxpayer may deduct as ordinary and necessary expense cost of maintaining access road to rental
property); Hartford v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 86, 90 (W.D. Wis. 1967) (taxpayer may deduct
as ordinary and necessary expenses legal fees and insurance premiums for rental property); Nelson
v. Commissioner, 47 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 78,287, at 78-1191 (1978) (taxpayer may deduct
as ordinary and necessary expenses costs of advertising and maintenance for condominium that
taxpayer held for production of income); Ree v. Commissioner, 32 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H)
63,125, at 63-665 (1963) (court allowed taxpayer deductions for cost of repairs, electricity, and
insurance as ordinary and necessary expenses for rental property); Tschupp v. Commissioner,
32 TAx CT. MEm. DEC. (P-H) 63,098 at 63-528 (1963) (court allowed taxpayer deduction for
expenses of janitorial service that taxpayer's sons performed on rental property); Thornbrough
v. Commissioner, I1 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 227, 227-28 (1952) (taxpayer may deduct sewer
tax paid on property as ordinary and necessary expense of operating rental property). Taxpayers,
however, may not claim as ordinary and necessary expenses the cost of making capital improvements
to property. See I.R.C. § 263(a) (West 1984) (taxpayer may not deduct cost of new buildings
.or permanent improvements that taxpayer made to increase value of property); see also Wacker
v. Commissioner, 49 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 80,324, at 80-1474 (1980) (court denied tax-
payer deduction for cost of survey on income-producing property because survey was capital
expenditure rather than ordinary and necessary expense); Perkins v. Commissioner, 11 TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) 532, 534-35 (1952) (court denied taxpayer deduction for cost of improvements
taxpayer made to prepare upper floor of residence for renting because improvements were capital
expenditures rather than ordinary and necessary expenses).
8. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 849 (1983) (rental of former residence at
fair market value suggests rental was activity for profit); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-(h) (1967) (taxpayer
may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses arising from rental of property even though property
was taxpayer's former residence). Although actual rental of property constitutes conversion of
1510
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expenses for insurance and maintenance of the property under section 212,9
and for depreciation of the property under sections 16710 and 168."1 While
a taxpayer may claim certain expense and depreciation deductions for residential
property that the taxpayer uses for the production of income, section 262 pro-
hibits the taxpayer from claiming these deductions for property that the tax-
payer uses as his personal residence.12 Consequently, taxpayers who rent their
residences while trying to sell may make the seemingly inconsistent claims that
the residence is not only the taxpayer's principal residence in order to claim
section 1034 rollover, but also income-producing property for the purpose of
the property into property that the taxpayer holds for the production of income, courts have
held that merely offering the property for rent or sale also can convert residential property into
property that the taxpayer holds for the production of income. See Briley v. United States, 189
F. Supp. 510, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1961) (taxpayer converted his former residence into property held
for production of income by offering residence for rent or sale even though taxpayer never rented
residence), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1962); Sherlock v. Commissioner,
31 TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 383, 385-86 (1972) (taxpayer converted his former residence into
property held for production of income by offering property for rent or sale); Horrmann v. Com-
missioner, 17 T.C. 903, 907-08 (1951) (taxpayer converted residence into property held for pro-
duction of income by offering property for rent even though taxpayers received no rental in-
come); Robinson v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 305, 307-08 (1943) (residence that taxpayers abandoned
and offered for rent or sale was income-producing property even though taxpayers received no
income from property).
A taxpayer, however, must make a good faith effort to rent the property before the mere
offering of property for rent or sale acts to convert the property to property the taxpayer holds
for the production of income. See Sherlock v. Commissioner, 31 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH)
383, 385-86 (1972) (taxpayer's offer to rent residential property must be bona fide offer to establish
conversion of residence into property taxpayer holds for production of income). In contrast,
a taxpayer who rents at below a reasonable rental value or below the fair market rental value
of the property may not establish successfully that he holds the property for the production of
income. See Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 323-24 (1976) (taxpayer who rented property
at well below fair market value to help taxpayer's friend could not claim rental deduction); Nicath
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 35 TAX CT. MEm. DEC. (P-H) 66,246, at 66-1415 (1966) (court
held taxpayer who rented residence to relatives at below fair market value could not claim rental
deductions). See generally Byrne, Conversion of A Personal Residence to a Business or Invest-
ment Use For Tax Purposes, 8 Rur.-CAm. 393 (1977) (conversion of personal residence into property
held for production of income).
9. See I.R.C. § 212 (West 1984) (taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses
attributable to management, conservation, or maintenance of property that taxpayer holds for
production of income); supra note 7 (cases allowing taxpayers deductions for ordinary and necessary
expenses attributable to rental property).
10. See I.R.C. § 167 (West 1984) (taxpayers may claim straight line depreciation deduction
for reasonable exhaustion, and wear and tear of property that taxpayer used in trade or business
or held for production of income).
11. See id. § 168 (accelerated cost recovery system for determining depreciation for property
that taxpayer began using in trade or business or holding for production of income after January
1, 1981).
12. See id. § 262 (taxpayers may not claim deductions for personal, living or family expenses
unless IRC provides otherwise); see, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 33 AFTR (P-H) 1672, 1673-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (court denied taxpayer maintenance and depreciation deductions for residential
property when court found taxpayer used residence as home rather than for production of income);
Gross v. United States, 51 AFTR 2d (P-H) 83-488, at 83-990 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (court denied
taxpayer deduction for lawn maintenance of taxpayer's personal residence); Sheldon v. Commis-
15111984]
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claiming maintenance and depreciation under sections 212, and 167 or 168.'1
The factors which indicate that a residence is a taxpayer's principal residence,
primarily occupancy of the residence by the taxpayer, suggest that the tax-
payer is using the property personally and therefore not holding the property
for the production of income."' The IRS contends that residential property
can be either the taxpayer's principal residence or property which the tax-
payer holds for the production of income, but not both at the same time."
Accordingly, the IRS maintains that a taxpayer who qualifies for section 1034
rollover on the gain realized from the sale of his former residence may not
also claim deduction for maintenance and depreciation if he rented the
residence prior tb its sale.' 6
When Congress enacted section 1034, Congress intended that a temporary
rental of a taxpayer's principal residence prior to sale should not render the
rollover provisions of section 1034 automatically inapplicable to any gain
realized from the sale. 7 Congress stated that although the term "principal
residence" in section 1034 seemingly would exclude property held for the pro-
duction of income, a taxpayer who temporarily rents his old principal residence
prior to sale nevertheless may qualify for the section 1034 rollover provided
the residence qualifies as the taxpayer's principal residence under section 1034.'1
sioner, 20 TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 241, 244 (1961) (court denied taxpayer expenses incurred
in changing rental property into personal residence because such expenses were personal living
expenses); Ford v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 499, 504 (1957) (taxpayer could not claim maintenance
deductions for property which taxpayer occupied and held for rent simultaneously). Deductions
for personal or family living expenses that the IRC allows are primarily interest payments, medical
expenses, or payments for state and local taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 163, 164, 213 (West 1984).
13. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 843-48 (1983) (taxpayer claimed residence
was not only taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034 but also property taxpayer held for
production of income under §§ 212 and 167).
14. See Maule, Rental of Principal Residence Before Sale: Retaining 1034 Treatment &
Rental Deductions, 55 J. TAx'N 8, 10 (1981) (factors such as occupancy and personal use that
indicate property is taxpayer's principal residence tend to show that taxpayer did not hold residence
for production of income).
15. See Bolaris v. Commissioners, 81 T.C. 840, 848 (1983) (IRS argued that taxpayer did
not hold property for production of income if property was taxpayer's principal residence); Private
Letter Ruling No. 8132017 (April 30, 1981) (IRS denied taxpayer deductions attributable to rental
of residence prior to sale when § 1034 applied to gain realized from sale); see supra notes 69-70
and accompanying text (IRS' argument in Bolaris that § 183 applies to limit presale rental expense
deductions if § 1034 applies to sale of residence).
16. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 848 (1983) (IRS contended that § 183 applied
to limit deductions for presale rental of residence when § 1034 applied to gain realized from
sale of residence).
17. See H.R. RP. No. 586, supra note 1, at 377, 436; S. REP. No. 781, supra note 1,
at 483. Congress stated in the legislative history to § 1034 that a taxpayer could rent temporarily
either the old residence before sale or the new residence before occupancy and still qualify for
§ 1034 treatment. H.R. REP. No. 586, supra note 1, at 377; S. RaP. No. 781, supra note 1,
at 483; see Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1956) (that taxpayer has rented residence is not deter-
minative of principal residence status under § 1034). But see infra note 18 and accompanying
text (term "principal residence" in § 1034 ordinarily excludes property taxpayer holds for pro-
duction of income).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 586, supra note 1, at 436; S. REP. No. 781, supra note 1, at 566.
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Whether a residence constitutes a taxpayer's principal residence for purposes
of section 1034 depends on the circumstances in each case, including the good
faith of the taxpayer.' 9 Therefore, rental of either an old principal residence
prior to sale, or of a new principal residence prior to occupancy, is not deter-
minative necessarily of whether a residence qualifies as a taxpayer's principal
residence for purposes of claiming section 1034 rollover.2"
Determination of principal residence status under section 1034 does not
require actual occupancy of the old residence by the taxpayer at the time of
sale.2 Section 1034 provides that the taxpayer must sell his old principal
residence within two years of the taxpayer's purchase and use of a new prin-
cipal residence.2 2 Courts generally require the taxpayer to have occupied the
old principal residence and to have moved into the new principal residence
within the two-year period. 23 Courts are reluctant to apply section 1034 to
Under § 1034, property that the taxpayer rents or hold for the production of income is not a
taxpayer's principal residence. See H.R. RaP. No. 586, supra note 1, at 436 (Congress used term
"principal residence" in § 1034 in contradistinction to property that taxpayer holds for produc-
tion of income). Although Congress intended that property is not a principal residence if the
taxpayer holds it for the production of income, Congress stated that a taxpayer who temporarily
rents his old residence prior to sale, or the new residence prior to occupancy, still may qualify
for 1034 rollover. See H.R. RaP. No. 586, supra note 1, at 436; S. REP. No. 781, supra note
1, at 566; Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1956) (taxpayer may rent temporarily new residence dur-
ing period before he vacates old residence and still qualify for § 1034 nonrecognition of gain);
see, e.g., Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 511-12 (1975) (court held § 1034 applied to
sale of old residence even though taxpayer temporarily rented residence prior to sale); Barry v.
Commissioner, 40 TAx CT. MEM. Dac. (P-H) 71,179, at 71-793 to -794 (1971) (taxpayer's tem-
porary rental of his old principal residence before sale did not bar application of § 1034 to gain
realized); Trisko v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 515, 518-20 (1957) (taxpayer may claim § 1034 rollover
on gain realized from sale of residence when taxpayer temporarily rented residence prior to sale);
infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (determination of principal residence status under §
1034). But see Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345, 355 (1963) (residence that taxpayer rented
before sale did not qualify as taxpayer's principal residence because taxpayer abandoned residence
as his principal residence).
19. Aagaard v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 191, 202 (1971) (whether residence is taxpayer's
principal residence under § 1034 depends on facts and circumstances of each case); Houlette v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 350, 354-55 (1967) (courts must determine principal residence status under
§ 1034 factually on case-by-case basis); Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1956) (courts should deter-
mine principal residence status under § 1034 by examining facts of each case and good faith
of taxpayer).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1956) (fact that taxpayer rented residence is not deter-
minative of whether residence is taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034); supra note 18 (courts
that applied § 1034 to gain realized from sale of residences that taxpayers rented prior to sale).
21. See Aagaard v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 191, 202 (1971) (court stated that taxpayer need
not occupy his old residence upon its sale to qualify for § 1034 rollover); Houlette v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 350, 354-56 (1967) (§ 1034 does not require that taxpayer actually occupy his
old residence at time of sale); Trisko v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 515, 518-19 (1957) (taxpayer
may claim § 1034 rollover on gain realized from sale of residence even though taxpayer did not
occupy old residence on date of sale); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1956) (taxpayer need
not occupy old residence at time of sale to qualify for § 1034 nonrecognition of realized gain).
22. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (,est 1984).
23. See Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345, 355 (1963) (court denied taxpayer nonrecogni-
tion of gain realized from sale of residence when taxpayer had not occupied old residence within
1984]
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the sale of a residence that a taxpayer has left vacant for more than two years
before the purchase of a new principal residence because a taxpayer may abuse
section 1034 by renting the residence and claiming rent-related expenses for
several years, and then selling the residence and claiming section 1034 rollover
for any gain realized from the sale.24 In certain circumstances, however, the
Tax Court will consider a residence that the taxpayer vacated for more than
two years before purchasing a new residence as the taxpayer's principal
residence under section 1034 to avoid unjust results.2" First, the Tax Court
has considered a residence as the taxpayer's principal residence even though
the taxpayer vacated the residence more than two years before purchasing a
new residence if the taxpayer left the residence with the intent to return.
2 6
§ 1034 time limit for purchase of new residence). In Stolk v. Commissioner a taxpayer sold his
old residence within a year of purchasing and occupying his new principal residence. Id. at 347.
At the time of the Stolk case, § 1034 required the sale of the old residence and the purchase
of the new residence to occur within a one-year period. See I.R.C. § 1034(a) (West 1963). However,
the Stolks had vacated the old residence two years before its sale. 40 T.C. at 346-47. The Tax
Court denied the Stolks nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale of the old residence,
reasoning that when the Stolks abandoned the residence with no intent to return, the residence
ceased to be the Stolks' principal residence for purposes of § 1034. Id. at 355-56. Although Con-
gress intended that a taxpayer could rent temporarily his old residence prior to sale and still
claim § 1034 rollover, the Stolk court determined that the temporary rental exception applied
primarily when a taxpayer has occupied the new principal residence and rents the former residence
during the statutory period of one year before selling the former residence. Id. at 355. Since
the Stolks rented their former residence for two years before the purchase of a new residence,
the court held the rental was not a temporary rental under § 1034. Id.
The Tax Court followed Stolk in Houlette v. Commissioner. See Houlette v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 350, 354-58 (1967) (court followed Stolk and denied taxpayer § 1034 nonrecognition
of gain realized from sale of residence that taxpayer abandoned six years before sale). In Houlette,
the court determined that a taxpayer abandoned his former residence by vacating the residence
with no intention of returning, and offering it for rent or sale. Id. at 356-57. Since the taxpayer
abandoned his former residence and did not occupy it for six years before the sale, the Houlette
court denied nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale. Id. Together, Houlette and Stolk
establish the actual occupancy rule that a taxpayer actually must occupy his former residence
within two years of the purchase of a new residence for the former residence to qualify as the
taxpayer's old principal residence under § 1034. See generally Hartwell, Sale or Exchange of
Personal Residence: Section 1034, 31 TAx L. Rav. 531, 531-47 (1976) (actual occupancy rule
under § 1034). The Tax Court, however, has fashioned two exceptions to the actual occupancy
rule to relieve taxpayers who are unable to comply with the two-year time limit. See infra notes
26-27 and accompanying text (Trisko and Clapham exceptions to actual occupancy rule).
24. See Hartwell, supra note 23, at 537 (actual occupancy rule is courts' response to tax-
payer's argument that residence qualifies as principal residence under § 1034 if taxpayer used
such residence as his principal residence at one time).
25. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (Trisko and Clapham exceptions to actual
occupancy rule). Courts have stated that a taxpayer who has vacated his residence for more than
two year prior to sale may claim § 1034 nonrecognition of the gain only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances. See Houlette v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 350, 354 (1967) (only exceptional and unusual
circumstances warrant conclusion that residence is taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034
if taxpayer is not occupying residence at time of sale). But see Lipton, Handling the Treatment
of Renting a Former Residence While Awaiting Its Sale, 58 J. TAX'N 170, 173 (1983) (Clapham
and Trisko opinions provide broad exceptions to actual occupancy rule).
26. See Trisko v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 515, 519-20 (1957). The taxpayers in Trisko v.
Commissioner moved out of their old residence in February of 1948 when Mr. Trisko's employer
1514
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Second, if the taxpayer abandons his residence intending to sell but is unable
to sell the residence within two years of vacating it due to circumstances beyond
the taxpayer's control, such as a poor housing market, the Tax Court never-
theless will consider the residence as the taxpayer's principal residence for pur-
poses of section 1034.27 However, as the length of time that a residence is
vacant or rented prior to sale increases, the taxpayer will have a harder time
proving that he intended to return to the residence or that he desired to sell
the residence but could not do so. 2 8
If a taxpayer uses property as his residence, section 262's prohibition of
personal consumption deductions will preclude the taxpayer from taking deduc-
transferred Trisko overseas. Id. at 516. While the Triskos were overseas, they rented their former
residence. Id. The first lease of the residence ran for one year, at which time the Triskos changed
the lease to a month-to-month tenancy so that they could reoccupy the residence upon their return
from overseas. Id. The taxpayers claimed and received rental deductions for the years in which
they rented the residence. Id. In 1951 the Triskos returned and attempted to occupy their residence
but could not evict the tenants due to rental control laws. Id. at 516-17. Since the Triskos could
not occupy their former residence, they purchased a new one at a price in excess of the value
of the old residence. Id. at 517. To afford the new residence, the Triskos sold the old residence
subject to the tenancy. Id. In their tax returns the Triskos claimed nonrecognition of the gain
realized from the sale of the former residence. Id. The IRS denied the Triskos § 1034 nonrecogni-
tion of the gain, claiming that the former residence was not the Trisko's principal residence under
the rollover provision but, rather, was property held for the production of income. Id. at 519.
The Tax Court rejected the IRS argument and held that the Triskos could defer recognition of
the gain realized from the sale pursuant to § 1034. Id. at 519-20. Specifically, the court reasoned
that since the Triskos intended to return to the residence and occupy it as their principal residence,
the rental was a secondary consideration to provide for care and maintenance of the residence
while the Triskos were overseas. Id. at 519. The court, therefore, determined that the rental of
the residence was a temporary rental and thus did not preclude nonrecognition of the gain realized
from the sale of the residence. Id. at 519-20. Consequently, the Trisko court allowed the tax-
payers nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale of the residence even though the tax-
payers had vacated the house more than a year prior to its sale and had rented the residence
and claimed rental deductions. Id.; see also Barry v. Commissioner, 40 TAX CT. MEm. Dac.
(P-H) 71,179, at 71-794 (1971) (taxpayer allowed § 1034 rollover on sale of residence even
though he had not occupied residence for several years and had rented residence and taken rental
deductions because rental was temporary rental that did not bar application of § 1034 to sale).
27. See Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 512 (1975) (court held taxpayer who aban-
doned his residence intending to sell could claim § 1034 rollover when sale occurred more than
two years after abandonment because market conditions prevented sale of residence and forced
taxpayer to rent residence). The taxpayers in Clapham v. Commissioner rented their residence
for more than two years prior to its sale. Id. at 506-07. In considering whether § 1034 applied
to the gain realized from the sale of the Claphams' old residence, the Clapham court reasoned
that since the Claphams at all times desired to sell their former residence rather than rent it,
the rental was ancillary to the Claphams' sales efforts and therefore was a temporary rental that
did not preclude nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale. Id. at 512; see infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text (Clapham court's decision to apply § 1034 to sale of residence when
rental of residence was ancillary to sale).
28. Compare Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 512 (1975) (taxpayer who vacated
and rented residence for more than two years before selling residence proved that market condi-
tions prevented him from selling residence) with Houlette v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 350, 356-57
(1967) (taxpayer who vacated and rented residence for more than six years before selling residence
did not prove that he intended to return to residence).
1984] 1515
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tions for maintenance, insurance, or depreciation of the property.29 To claim
these deductions the taxpayer must cease using the property as a residence
and convert the residence into property held for the production of income
under section 212.10 To establish conversion the taxpayer must show that he
used the residential property in an activity engaged in for profit." Courts
generally have held that the rental of a former residence at fair market value32
is an activity that the taxpayer engages in for profit. 3
Section 183 of the IRC, which limits deductions for activities that the
taxpayer does not engage in for profit, establishes a test for determining whether
a taxpayer engages in an activity for profit. 31 Section 183's profit-production
test focuses on whether a taxpayer had the honest objective of making a profit
rather than a reasonable expectation of making a profit. 35 In determining
whether a taxpayer had the honest objective of making a profit, courts examine
29. See I.R.C. § 262 (West 1984) (taxpayers may not deduct personal, living or family expenses
unless I.R.C. provides otherwise); supra note 12 (cases denying taxpayer deductions for expenses
of maintaining personal residence).
30. See I.R.C. § 212 (West 1984) (taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses
arising from property that taxpayer holds for production of income); see also Horrmann v. Com-
missioner, 17 T.C. 903, 907-08 (1951) (taxpayer may claim maintenance and depreciation deduc-
tions for residential property provided taxpayer held property for production of income); Robin-
son v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 305, 306-07 (1943) (taxpayer may claim maintenance and deprecia-
tion deductions for residence that taxpayer converted into property held for production of income);
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (1957) (taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in connection with property taxpayer holds as rental property).
31. See Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 319 (1976) (taxpayer must rent residence
with primary intention of making profit to claim maintenance and depreciation deductions); Byrne,
supra note 8, at 393 (taxpayer must cease using property as residence and use residence in profit-
making activity to establish conversion of personal residence to property held for production
of income); supra note 8 and accompanying text (rental of residence at fair market value con-
stitutes holding residence for production of income).
32. See People ex rel. Mortgage Comm'r v. Miller, 6 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1938) (fair rental
value of property is value lessor could rent property for in market if lessor is free and able to rent).
33. See Byrne, supra note 8, at 395 (actual rental of residential property converts residence
into property taxpayer holds for production of income); supra note 8 (rental of residence at fair
market value constitutes activity taxpayer engages in for profit).
34. I.R.C. § 183 (West 1984); see infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (§ 183 test for
determining whether taxpayer engages in activity for profit). Section 183 defines an activity that
a taxpayer does not engage in for profit as an activity for which the taxpayer could not claim
deductions under §§ 162 or 212. I.R.C. § 183(c) (West 1984). Since § 183 defines nonprofit activity
in terms of § 212, the § 212 case law for determining whether a taxpayer engages in an activity
for the production of income remains valid for determining whether a taxpayer engages in an
activity for profit under § 183. See Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 321 (1976) (§
212 case law still relevant in determining whether taxpayer engages in activity for profit because
§ 183 test derives from § 212 case law); Benz v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 375, 383 (1974) (IRS
regulation for § 183 originated in § 212 case law).
35. See Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715, 720 (1978) (determination of taxpayer's profit
motive depends on taxpayer's good faith expectation of making profit instead of taxpayer's
reasonable expectation of making profit); Gorod v. Commissioner, 42 TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH)
1569, 1571 (1981) (§ 183 requires that taxpayer enter activity with bona fide intention of making
profit rather than reasonable expectation of making profit); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972) (tax-
payer need not have reasonable expectation of making profit to prove that taxpayer engaged
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objective factors rather than the taxpayer's subjective intent.3 6 Courts generally
do not require the taxpayer to show that the activity actually produced a pro-
fit, but instead examine all of the circumstances in each case to determine
whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit. 7 Additionally, the
taxpayer normally bears the burden of proving that he in fact engaged in the
activity for profit.3 8 However, if for two or more out of five consecutive years
in activity for profit). Courts determine whether a taxpayer had a good faith objective of making
a profit from an activity by examining the totality of the circumstances of each case. See Church-
man v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 696, 701 (1977) (whether taxpayer engaged in activity for profit
depends on all circumstances in each case); see, e.g., Scull v. Commissioner, 45 TAX CT. MEM.
DEC. (CCH) 540, 544-45 (1983) (taxpayer who rented residence at loss without written lease to
assist relatives and without ascertaining fair market rental value of property did not rent residence
with honest objective of making profit); Gorod v. Commissioner, 42 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH)
1569, 1571-72 (1981) (taxpayer established honest objective of making profit by showing that
he repeatedly advertised property held for rent and kept property ready for rental even though
he did not secure tenant for property); Wittstruck v. Commissioner, 39 TA CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 1168, 1169-70 (1980) (court denied taxpayer rental deductions when court found even
most optimistic person could not hope to profit by renting in manner that taxpayer rented property);
Hollesen v. Commissioner, 38 TAX CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) 1058, 1060-61 (1979) (taxpayer who
used mobile home as recreational vehicle for greater time than taxpayer rented mobile home did
not own mobile home with primary intent to make profit).
36. See Flowers v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914, 932 (1983) (courts give objective facts greater
weight than taxpayer's statements of intent in determining whether taxpayer engaged in activity
for profit); Scull v. Commissioner, 45 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 540, 542 (1983) (objective
factors are more important than taxpayer's subjective intent under § 183 profit test); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.183-2(a) (1972) (courts should give greater weight to objective factors than taxpayer's subjec-
tive intent in determining whether taxpayer engaged in activity for profit under § 183). The treasury
regulations to § 183 provide that courts should determine whether a taxpayer engaged in an activity
for profit by examining all the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. The IRS, however, has
established nine factors to guide courts in determining whether a taxpayer engaged in an activity
for profit. Id. § 1.183-2(b)(1)-(9). These factors include the manner in which the taxpayer manages
the activity, the taxpayer's expertise in the area, the time the taxpayer spends on the activity,
the chance that assets used in the activity will appreciate in value, the taxpayer's record of losses
regarding the activity, the amount of profits the taxpayer earns, the taxpayer's financial status,
and the amount of enjoyment the taxpayer derives from the activity. Id. The nine factors, however,
are more helpful to courts in determining whether taxpayers engaged in farming or other hobbies
for profit than in determining whether taxpayers engaged in rental activity for profit because
of the simple nature and sometimes short duration of rental activity. See Whittstruck v. Commis-
sioner, 39 TAx CT. MEa. DEC. (CCH) 1168, 1169 (1980) (nine factors for evaluating whether
taxpayer engaged in activity for profit are more relevant to farm and hobby activity than rental
activity); Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 321 n.6 (1976) (Jasionowski court did not
find IRS' nine factors helpful in determining whether taxpayers rented residence with intent to
make profit because factors apply primarily to farm and hobby activity).
37. See Sherlock v. Commissioner, 31 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 383, 385 (1972) (existence
of taxpayer's bona fide offer to rent property is more important than taxpayer's actual receipt
of rental income in determining whether taxpayer rented property with primary intention of mak-
ing profit); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(7) (1976) (although taxpayers need not show profit to engage
in activity for profit, existence of profit may be evidence that taxpayers had intent to profit).
But see Scull v. Commissioner, 45 TAx CT. MEz. DEC. (CCH) 540, 544-45 (1983) (large losses
from activity may be evidence that taxpayer did not engage in activity with expectation of making
profit).
38. See Langford v. Commissioner, 42 TAX CT. Mam. DEC. (CCH) 1160, 1163 (1981) (tax-
payer has burden to prove that he engaged in activity to make profit in order to claim § 212
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the gross income from an activity exceeds the deductions allowable for the
activity, then under section 183(d) courts will presume the taxpayer engaged
in the activity for profit.39 If the taxpayer establishes the section 183(d) presump-
tion, the burden is on the IRS to prove that the taxpayer did not have the
honest objective of making a profit.
4
1
If a court determines that a taxpayer did not engage in an activity for
profit, section 183 limits the profit-related deductions for the activity. 4' Con-
gress enacted section 183 to close tax loopholes for hobby-loss activities or
other activities that taxpayers undertake to create a loss which will shelter
other income items.42 To determine the deductions that section 183 allows for
an activity, a taxpayer initially must subtract from the total income of the
activity those deductions that the taxpayer could deduct without regard to
whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit.4 3 Such nonprofit-related
deductions); Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 426 (1979) (burden of proving intent to
make profit under § 183 is on taxpayer).
39. See I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1984). A taxpayer establishes the § 183(d) presumption that
he engaged in an activity for profit if for two or more years out of a consecutive five-year period
the gross income from the activity exceeds the amount of the deductions, such as interest or
tax payment deductions under §§ 163 and 164, which the taxpayer could have claimed for the
property regardless of whether he used the property in a profit producing activity. Id. See generally
Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REv. 347,
354-59 (1974) (analysis of § 183(d) presumption that taxpayer engages in activity for profit).
40. I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1984).
41. Id.; see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (method for determining deductions
for activities that taxpayer did not engage in for profit under § 183).
42. H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200,
245; see Lee, supra note 39, at 348-53 (discussing legislative history of § 183).
43. See I.R.C. § 183(b) (West 1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(1) (1972) (establishing three-
tier system for determining deductions under § 183). Under the three-tier system for determining
deductions under § 183, a taxpayer makes a tier-one calculation by subtracting from the gross
income of an activity those deductions that the taxpayer could have claimed regardless of whether
the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit, such an interest deductions under § 163. Id. If
any income remains after tier one, then in tier two the taxpayer may take deductions that he
could have claimed had he engaged in the activity for profit provided the deductions do not
result in a change in the basis of the property. Id. For example, maintenance and insurance deduc-
tions for rental property do not affect the basis of the property and therefore are appropriate
tier-two deductions. See I.R.C. § 212 (West 1984) (taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred from property taxpayer holds for production of income). The tier-two deduc-
tions, however, cannot exceed the income remaining after the taxpayer makes the tier-one deduc-
tions. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(b)(1) (1972). Id. From any income remaining after the taxpayer takes
the tier-two deductions, the taxpayer may take any deductions that he could have claimed had
he engaged in the activity for profit which would affect the basis of the property involved in
the activity. Id. For example, depreciation of rental property is an appropriate tier-three deduc-
tion because the taxpayer must reduce the basis of the property by the amount of the deduction.
Id.; see I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2)(A) (West 1984) (taxpayer shall reduce basis of property for which
taxpayer claimed depreciation deduction by amount of deduction if deduction resulted in reduc-
tion of taxpayer's taxes). As with the tier-two deductions, § 183 limits the tier-three deductions
to the income remaining from the activity after subtracting the tier-one and tier-two deductions.
Id. Consequently, § 183 prevents the taxpayer from using a loss incurred in activities that the
taxpayer did not engage in for profit to shelter income from other sources. See generally Lee,
supra note 39, at 359-65 (three-tier system for deductions under § 183).
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deductions include interest expenses or tax deductions under sections 163 and
164." From any income remaining after taking tax and interest deductions,
the taxpayer may take those deductions that he could have claimed if he had
engaged in the activity for profit. 45 Such profit-related deductions include
maintenance and depreciation deductions under sections 212 and 167 or 168.6
Section 183 thus limits the profit-related deductions for activities that the tax-
payer does not engage in for profit to the income that remains after the tax-
payer subtracts the nonprofit-related deductions from the gross income the
activity generates., 7 Accordingly, section 183 prevents taxpayers from using
deductions attributable to activities which the taxpayer did not engage in for
profit to shelter the taxpayer's income from other sources. 8
In considering the relationship between the rollover provisions of section
1034 and rental deductions for maintenance and depreciation under sections
212 and 167 or 168, the IRS contends that a residence cannot be a taxpayer's
principal residence and property held for the production of income at the same
time.49 Specifically, the IRS argues that if a taxpayer rents his principal residence
44. See I.R.C. § 163 (West 1984) (taxpayer may claim as deductions amount taxpayer pays
as interest on indebtedness during tax year); Id. § 164 (taxpayer may claim as deductions amount
taxpayer paid as state and local personal property taxes).
45. See I.R.C. § 183(b)(2) (West 1984); supra note 43 (three-tier system for calculating §
183 deductions).
46. See I.R.C. § 212 (West 1984) (taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses
attributable to property taxpayer holds for production of income); Id. § 167 (taxpayer may claim
straight line depreciation deduction for reasonable exhaustion, and wear and tear of property
that taxpayer used in trade or business or holds for production of income); Id. § 168 (accelerated
cost recovery system for determining depreciation for property that taxpayer began using in trade
or business or holding for production of income after January 1, 1981).
47. See I B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAxATiON OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 22.5.4 (1981)
(deductions allowable under § 183).
48. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (§ 183 prevents taxpayers from claiming
profit-related deductions in excess of income taxpayers received from activity that they did not
engage in for profit).
49. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 848 (1983) (IRS argued that property which
constituted taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034 could not be property which taxpayer
held for production of income under § 212); Private Letter Ruling No. 8132017 (April 30, 1981).
In Letter Ruling 8132017, the IRS denied the taxpayers rental deductions that the taxpayers had
claimed for the rental of their principal residence prior to sale. The taxpayers rented the residence
at its fair market value several times over a four-year period. Id. The taxpayers eventually sold
the residence and claimed nonrecognition of the gain pursuant to § 1034. Id. The IRS ruled that
§ 1034 applied to the sale under Clapham v. Commissioner. Id.; see infra notes 81-89 and accom-
panying text (Clapham court held that rental of a principal residence ancillary to sale did not
bar application of § 1034 to gain realized from sale). The IRS then ruled that because the rental
activity did not preclude application of § 1034 to the sale of the residence, the taxpayers did
not rent the residence with the intent to make a profit. Private Letter Ruling No. 8132017 (April
30, 1981). Specifically, the IRS stated that because § 1034 applied, the property was the tax-
payers' principal residence in contradistinction to property that the taxpayers held for the pro-
duction of income. Id. The IRS admitted that residential property rented at a fair market rental
is ordinarily property that a taxpayer holds for the production of income regardless of whether
the rental actually produces a profit. Id. The IRS, however, determined that a fair market rental
differs from a presale rental because in a fair market rental situation the taxpayer usually rents
for long periods of time, hoping to profit from appreciation of the property, or from a future
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temporarily prior to sale of the residence to qualify for section 1034 rollover,
then the taxpayer's dominant motive was the sale of the residence." Since
the taxpayer's dominant motive was to sell rather than to rent the residence
for a profit, the IRS contends that section 183 should apply to limit deduc-
tions for the rental activity." The Tax Court, in Bolaris v. Commissioner,2
adopted the IRS contention that section 183 limits rental deductions for the
rental of a taxpayer's principal residence prior to sale."
In Bolaris, the taxpayers lived in a residence that they had purchased in
1975 for $44,000.14 In July 1977, the Bolarises started construction of a new
principal residence and on July 14 began efforts to sell the old residence in
anticipation of occupying the new residence." When the Bolarises occupied
the new residence in October of 1977, they still had not secured a buyer for
the old residence." To ease the financial burden of owning both properties,
the Bolarises began renting their former residence until they could find a buyer
for the property." The Bolarises finally sold the old residence in August of
1978 for $70,000.58 In their tax returns for 1977 and 1978, the Bolarises claimed
nonrecognition of the $20,708.48 gain from the sale of the old residence pur-
suant to section 1034." 9 The Bolarises also claimed deductions for expenses
increase in rental income. Id. On the other hand, the IRS concluded that since in a presale rental
situation the taxpayer at all times intends to sell his residence, the taxpayer cannot argue that
the residence may appreciate in value or that the rental eventually may produce a profit. Id.
Consequently, the IRS ruled that the taxpayers did not engage in the presale rental for profit,
and, accordingly, applied § 183 to the presale rental. Id. But see infra notes 93-99 and accompa-
nying text (temporary rental distinction under § 1034 should not apply to question of rental deduc-
tions under §§ 212 or 183); supra note 8 and accompanying text (residence rented at fair market
value is property taxpayer holds for production of income even though taxpayer also offers property
for sale).
50. See supra note 49 (IRS argues that taxpayer's temporary rental of residence prior to
sale is not activity that taxpayer engages in for profit).
51. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 848 (1983) (IRS argued that property which
was taxpayer's principal residence under § 1034 could not be property held for production of
income under § 212); see also Lipton, supra note 25, at 171 (IRS will argue § 183 applies to
limit rental deductions when taxpayer rents residence at loss and holds residence for sale); supra
note 49 (Private Letter Ruling discussing IRS position regarding rental deductions and § 1034
rollover).
52. 81 T.C. 840 (1983).
53. Id. at 848-49.
54. Id. at 841-42.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Bolarises' first tenant occupied the residence in October of 1978, renting on
a month-to-month tenancy at the fair market rental value of the house. Id. The tenancy con-
tinued until the Bolarises decided that the likelihood of selling the former residence increased
if the residence was vacant. Id. Accordingly, the Bolarises ended the tenancy and the tenant vacated
the Bolarises' former residence at the end of May, 1978. Id. The Bolarises subsequently found
a buyer for the former residence. Id. The Bolarises again rented the residence in August, 1978
to the buyer at the fair market rental value of the house until the buyer could obtain financing
to complete the sale. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 843.
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and depreciation in connection with the rental of the old residence under sec-
tions 212 and 167.60
The Tax Court in Bolaris held that the Bolarises rightfully deferred recogni-
tion of the gain from the sale of the old residence pursuant to section 1034.61
While the IRS did not contend seriously that section 1034 did not apply to
the gain, the IRS argued that the court should disallow nonrecognition of
the gain if the court allowed the rental deductions because, if the court allowed
the rental deductions, the residence would be property held for the produc-
tion of income and thus would not be the taxpayer's principal residence within
the section 1034 rollover provisions.62 The Tax Court determined that at all
times the Bolarises' primary motive was to sell the residence rather than to
hold the residence as income-producing property. 63 The court noted that since
the Bolarises' dominant motive was to sell the residence rather than to rent
the residence, the rental activity was ancillary to the Bolarises' sales efforts. 64
The court stated that since the rental activity was ancillary to the sales efforts,
the rental was the type of temporary rental activity which Congress intended
should not preclude application of section 1034 to the gain realized from the
sale of a principal residence. 6 Consequently, the Tax Court held that the
60. Id. The Bolarises claimed maintenance and insurance deductions under § 212, and
depreciation expenses under § 167. Id. In 1977, the Bolarises received a rental income of $1,271.00
and claimed deductions of $1,505.28 for mortgage interest, $252.77 for property taxes, $542.67
for miscellaneous rental expenses, $236.00 for insurance, and $377.00 for depreciation, resulting
in a loss for 1977 of $3,738.00. Id. For 1978, the Bolarises received a rental income of $2,717.00
and claimed deductions of $4,911.68 for mortgage interest, $720.32 for property taxes, $692.12
for miscellaneous rental expenses, and $1,120.16 for depreciation, resulting in a loss of 1978
of $4,727.28. Id.
61. See id. at 843-48 (Bolaris court held § 1034 applied to sale of Bolarises' former residence);
see also infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (Clapham court's holding that rental of prin-
cipal residence prior to sale did not bar application of § 1034 to sale when taxpayers dominant
motive was to sell residence).
62. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 844 (1983). The IRS admitted that under
the facts in Bolaris the taxpayers should qualify for § 1034 rollover. Id. The IRS argued, however,
that if the court allowed the Bolarises maintenance and depreciation deductions under §§ 212
and 167, the court should disallow nonrecognition of the gain from the sale of the residence
under § 1034. Id.; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (IRS argument that property
cannot be taxpayer's principal residence and property held for production of income at same time).
63. 81 T.C. 840, 844-47 (1983). The Bolaris court found that a poor real estate market
prevented the Bolarises from selling their former residence and consequently the Bolarises rented
their former residence to ease the financial strain of owning both their old and new principal
residences. Id. When the Bolarises decided that a vacant house had a better chance of selling
than a rented house, the Bolarises ended the first month-to-month tenancy. Id. at 842. Conse-
quently, the Bolaris court concluded that the Bolarises' primary motive at all times was to sell
the residence rather than to make a profit from the rental. Id. at 848-50.
64. Id. In determining that the Bolarises' rental was ancillary to their sales efforts, the
Bolaris court followed the Tax Court's decision in Clapham v. Commissioner. Id. at 845-47;
see Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 512 (1975) (court held that § 1034 applied to sale
of residence even though taxpayers rented residence prior to sale because taxpayers' dominant
intent was to sell rather than to rent residence); infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (Clapham
court's reasoning that rental ancillary to sale does not bar application of § 1034 to sale).
65. 81 T.C. 840, 847; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (Congress intended
the taxpayer could rent his residence temporarily prior to sale and still claim § 1034 rollover).
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Bolarises' temporary rental of their residence prior to its sale did not bar sec-
tion 1034 nonrecognition of the gain realized from the sale of the Bolarises'
residence.66
After holding that section 1034 applied the sale of the Bolarises' former
residence, the Tax Court addressed the Bolarises' claim for rental deductions
under section 212 and 167.67 The Bolarises argued that the rental of the
residence at its fair market value established that the rental was a profit
activity.68 The IRS, however, contended that because the rental did not bar
the application of section 1034 to the realized gain, the rental did not convert
the property from principal residence status into income-producing property
and therefore the rental was not an activity engaged in for profit for purposes
of sections 212 and 167.69 Accordingly, the IRS contended that because sec-
tion 183 applies to activities not engaged in for profit, section 183 should limit
the amount of profit-related deductions the Bolarises could claim from the
temporary rental of their former residence. 7 The Tax Court noted that
ordinarily the rental of a former residence at fair market value suggested that
the rental was a profit-making activity.7 ' The court, however, agreed with the
IRS that the factors which allowed the Bolarises to claim the section 1034
rollover precluded a finding that the Bolarises engaged in the rental to make
a profit. 7 The court reasoned that since the rental was a temporary rental
that did not bar application of section 1034 to the gain realized from the sale
of the residence, the rental was ancillary to the sale of the residence." The
Tax Court stated that because the rental was ancillary to the sale of the residence
to the extent that the Bolarises' dominant motive was to sell the residence
rather than to hold it for the production of income, the Bolarises did not
66. 81 T.C. 840, 847; see infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (Clapham court held
that rental of residence ancillary to sale was temporary rental that did not preclude application
of § 1034 to sale of residence).
67. 81 T.C. 840, 847-50; see supra note 60 (deductions Bolarises claimed in connection
with rental of their former residence).
68. 81 T.C. 840, 848; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (courts generally consider
rental of residences at fair market value as activity that taxpayers engage in for profit).
69. See 81 T.C. 840, 848 (IRS argued that facts which established that rental did not bar
§ 1034 also established that Bolarises did not retain former residence for production of income).
The IRS argued that since the Bolarises' rental was ancillary to their sales efforts, the Bolarises
did not rent the residence with the objective of making a profit. Id.; see supra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text (Bolaris court found that Bolarises' rental of former residence was ancillary
to sales efforts).
70. 81 T.C. 840, 848; see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (§ 183 limitation on
deductions for activity that taxpayer does not engage in for profit).
71. 81 T.C. 840, 849; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (courts and IRS generally
view rental of residence at fair market value as activity that taxpayer engaged in for profit).
72. 81 T.C. 840, 849-50. The Bolaris court determined that since the Bolarises only rented
on a month-to-month tenancy, and ended the tenancy when they decided a vacant residence would
sell faster than a rented one, the Bolarises did not rent their residence with the primary intention
of making a profit. Id.; see supra note 63 and accompanying text (fact that Bolarises limited
their rental activities to facilitate sale of their residence indicated that Bolarises' rental activity
was ancillary to sale of residence).
73. 81 T.C. 840, 849-50.
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rent the residence with the primary motive of making a profit.74 Accordingly,
the Tax Court held that section 183 applied to the rental activity to limit the
Bolarises' deductions for maintenance expenses and depreciation."
The dissent in Bolaris argued that Congress did not intend for sections
1034 and 212 to be mutually exclusive, and that consequently the application
of section 1034 to the realized gain from the sale of a residence does not make
section 183 automatically apply to any presale rental of the residence.7 6 The
dissent stated that although Congress intended that taxpayers should be able
to rent temporarily a residence before sale and still claim the section 1034
rollover for gain realized from the sale of the residence, Congress did not
intend for courts to treat temporary rentals differently than other rentals for
the purpose of applying section 212." Accordingly, the dissent maintained
that whether the rental was ancillary to the sale is not important in determin-
ing whether the taxpayer engaged in the rental for profit under either section
212 or section 183.78 Since the Bolarises rented their former residence at its
fair market value, the dissent concluded that the court should allow the
Bolarises the deductions pursuant to sections 212 and 167.79
In determining that the rental of a former residence ancillary to sale does
not prevent application of section 1034 to any gain realized from the sale,
the Bolaris court relied heavily on the Tax Court's reasoning in Clapham v.
Commissioner.8 In Clapham, the taxpayer abandoned their residence intend-
74. Id.; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (IRS argued in Bolaris that rental
ancillary to sale was not activity that taxpayer engaged in for profit).
75. 81 T.C. 840, 850. The Bolarises could not claim any deductions for rental activity under
§ 183 because they did not receive rental income in excess of the deductions attributable to the
property without regard to whether they rented the residence for profit. Id. In 1977, the Bolarises
received rental income of $1,271.00 but had mortgage interest and property tax deductions under
§§ 163 and 164 totalling $1,757.55. Id. at 851 (Korner, J., concurring). In 1978, the Bolarises
received rental income of $2,717.00 but had mortgage interest and property tax deductions totall-
ing $5,632.00. Id. Since no rental income remained after subtracting the deductions for mortgage
interest and property taxes from the gross rental income, the Bolarises could not claim any rental
deductions under § 183. Id; see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (§ 183 method for
determining deductions attributable to activity that taxpayer did not engage in for profit).
76. 81 T.C. 840, 853 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
77. Id. The dissent in Bolaris noted that a temporary fair market rental of a new principal
residence before occupancy by the taxpayer clearly would be an activity the taxpayer engaged
in for profit, thus entitling the taxpayer to maintenance and depreciation deductions for the property.
Id. The dissent also noted that a new principal residence, even though formerly rented, still could
be the taxpayer's new principal residence under § 1034. Id. The dissent concluded that the Bolaris
holding requires different treatment of the old and new principal residences under § 1034 by
denying taxpayers maintenance and depreciation deductions for the temporary rental of their
old principal residences prior to sale. Id. The dissent maintained, however, that Congress intend-




80. See id. at 847-50 (Bolaris court held that rental ancillary to sale is not activity that
taxpayers engage in for profit); Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 512 (1975) (rental of
residence ancillary to sale did not preclude application of § 1034 to gain realized from sale).
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ing to sell it.' The taxpayers, however, could not find a buyer for the residence
and resorted to renting the residence.82 After renting the residence for three
years, the Claphams were able to sell the residence. 3 A year before the sale
of the former residence, the Claphams had purchased a new principal
residence. 4 Since the sale of the former residence occurred within two years
after the purchase of the new residence, the Claphams claimed nonrecogni-
tion of the gain realized from the sale of the former residence under section
1034.5 The IRS denied the Claphams the section 1034 rollover, arguing that
section 1034 did not apply because the former residence ceased to be the
Claphams' principal residence when the Claphams abandoned the residence
with no intent to return. 6 The Tax Court, however, stated that the Claphams'
intent at all times during the rental of the property was to sell the residence
rather than to hold the property for the production of income, but that a
poor housing market prevented the Claphams from obtaining a buyer.8 7 The
court reasoned that since the Claphams at all times desired to sell the residence,
the rental was ancillary to the sale of the residence and therefore was the type
of temporary rental Congress contemplated as being consistent with applica-
tion of section 1034.88 Accordingly, the Tax Court held that section 1034 per-
mitted the Claphams to defer recognition of the gain realized from the sale
of the Claphams' former residence. 9
The Clapham court was correct in finding that Congress intended not only
that section 1034 ordinarily should not apply to property that a taxpayer holds
for the production of income, but also that in certain circumstances taxpayers
81. 63 T.C. at 512. The taxpayers in Clapham offered their old residence for sale in August,
1966. Id.
82. Id. The Claphams received no offers to purchase their residence until the spring of
1967, when the Claphams received an offer to lease the residence with an option to purchase.
Id. Financial circumstances compelled the Claphams to accept the offer. Id. The Claphams' tenant,
however, vacated the house without buying in the spring of 1968. Id. The Claphams again listed
the residence for sale. Id. The Claphams still could not secure a buyer and again rented the residence
in the fall of 1968 until December. Id. at 507. The residence remained vacant until the Claphams
sold it in June, 1969. Id.
83. Id. at 507. The Claphams sold their former residence for $32,000.00. Id. Since the
basis of the residence was $26,453.00, the Claphams realized a gain on the sale of their former
residence of approximately $5,500.00. Id.
84. Id. The Claphams purchased a new principal residence in September, 1968 for $31,500.00.
Id.
85. Id. At the time the Claphams claimed the § 1034 rollover, § 1034 required that the
purchase of the new residence and the sale of the former residence occur within one year. See
I.R.C. § 1034 (1963).
86. 63 T.C. 507-508 (1975).
87. Id. at 506-07. The Clapham court emphasized that a poor real estate market prevented
the Claphams from securing a reasonable offer to purchase the residence and forced the Claphams
to rent the residence until they could find a buyer. Id.
88. Id. at 510-12; see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (Congress intended for
taxpayers to be able to rent their principal residences temporarily before sale and still claim benefits
of § 1034 rollover).
89. 63 T.C. at 512.
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like the Claphams could claim the section 1034 rollover if they temporarily
rented their former residence prior to sale.90 Congress did not intend to deny
taxpayers the benefits of section 1034 in the event that market circumstances
prevented a taxpayer from selling his former residence at the time the tax-
payer vacated it.91 Consequently, as the Clapham court held, when a rental
is ancillary to sales efforts, the rental is a temporary rental and therefore not
the kind of income-producing activity that precludes application of section
1034.92
However, the rental ancillary to sale rationale in Clapham is applicable
only for the purpose of determining whether a residence is a taxpayer's prin-
cipal residence under section 1034. 9 3 No evidence exists suggesting that Con-
gress intended that the temporary rental exception for applying section 1034
to residential property which the taxpayer has rented should affect the
application of sections 212 or 183 to the rental activity.9 4 The Clapham case
did not involve the issue of rental deductions for the years the Claphams rented
their former residence prior to sale, nor did the Clapham opinion mention
whether the Claphams had claimed or received deductions for their rent-related
expenses.9" The Bolaris court, however, took the Clapham ancillary to sales
rationale for holding that a rental was only a temporary rental under section
1034 and applied the rationale to limit rent-related expenses to those section
183 allows. 96 The Bolaris court did not explain why the ancillary to sale rationale
of Clapham should apply also to sections 212 and 183. 9 Rather, the Bolaris
court merely held that if rental activity was ancillary to a taxpayer's sales efforts
and thus a temporary rental under section 1034, then the rental was not a
profit-making activity and consequently section 183, instead of section 212,
controls the extent of rental deductions. 8 By blindly applying the Clapham
90. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (Congress intended that taxpayer could
rent temporarily his principal residence before sale consistent with § 1034 even though § 1034
ordinarily does not apply to property taxpayer holds for production of income).
91. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (§ 1034 is relief provision that Congress enacted
to help taxpayers who have to change residences).
92. 63 T.C. at 512.
93. See id. at 507 (Clapham court stated that sole issue in Clapham was whether Claphams'
rental activity was type which precluded application of § 1034 to gain realized from sale).
94. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 853-55 (1983) (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (Bolaris
dissent argued that Congress did not intend for temporary rental exception under § 1034 to affect
application of §§ 212 or 183 to rental activity); infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text (§
280A(d)(4) suggests that Congress did not intend that taxpayer could not claim rental deductions
for temporary rental of principal residence prior to sale).
95. See 63 T.C. at 507 (sole issue in Clapham was whether sale of Claphams' former residence
qualified for § 1034 treatment); see also Maule, supra note 14, at 9 n.12 (Clapham opinion did
not reveal whether Claphams' sought rental deductions).
96. See Bolaris, 81 T.C. 840, 847-50 (court held that since rental of residence was ancillary
to sale, taxpayer did not rent residence with primary intention of making a profit).
97. See id. at 853-54 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 850. Although the Bolaris court noted that the availability of rental deductions
would depend on the circumstances of each case, the court stated that as a general proposition,
a taxpayer's temporary rental of his principal residence ancillary to sales efforts would not qualify
for rental deductions under § 212. Id.
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ancillary to sales analysis to the rental activity in Bolaris, the Bolaris court
rendered sections 1034 and 183 mutually inclusive, and sections 1034 and 212
mutually exclusive. 99
Congress, however, has indicated no intent that sections 1034 and 212
should be mutually exclusive.' Moreover, a 1978 amendment to section 280A
of the IRC implies that Congress condones taxpayers taking both rent-related
deductions and section 1034 rollover at the same time.' 0 ' Congress passed sec-
tion 280A to cover the rental deductions available to a taxpayer who both
rents and makes personal use of a residence during a year.'0 2 Although Con-
gress passed section 280A mainly to limit rental deductions that taxpayers may
claim from the rental of vacation homes, section 280A may apply to any
property that a taxpayer uses as a dwelling unit. 103 Congress enacted section
280A to replace the activity for profit test of section 183 for determining
whether a taxpayer may claim rent-related deductions because of the difficulty
in determining a taxpayer's dominant intent in renting a vacation home for
a few months out of a year.0 4 Section 280A changes the method for deter-
mining rental deductions from the section 183 profit test to an inquiry into
the amount of personal use the taxpayer makes of a residence that he also
rents during the year. 5 Section 280A allows a taxpayer to claim rental deduc-
99. See id. at 853 (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (Bolaris dissent criticizes majority for effectively
rendering §§ 1034 and 212 mutually exclusive).
100. See id. (Congress did not intend to amend § 212 by enacting § 1034).
101. See I.R.C. § 280A(d)(4) (West 1984) (§ 280A limitations on rental deductions do not
apply to taxpayer who rents principal residence under § 1034 for qualified rental period); infra
notes 102-15 and accompanying text (§ 280A(d)(4) implies that Congress intended taxpayer to
be able to deduct losses incurred in rental of taxpayer's principal residence prior to sale).
102. See JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 136, 142-43, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B. 148, 154-55 [hereinafter
cited as JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION]. Congress stated that under §§ 212 and 183 courts have
had difficulty in determining whether a taxpayer who lives in a residence part of the year and
rents the residence for the other part of the year is engaged in an activity for profit. Id. Congress
noted that the problem is even more difficult when the property is a taxpayer's vacation home.
Id. Consequently, Congress replaced the §§ 212 and 183 profit test with § 280A which allows
deductions a taxpayer could take regarding residences that the taxpayer both lives in and rents
during the same year according to the amount of personal and rental use the taxpayer makes
of the property. Id. See generally Goff, Commingling Business and Personal Use of Real Property:
Severe Restrictions Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 493 (1978) (analysis of
§ 280A).
103. See I.R.C. § 280A(f) (West 1983) (dwelling unit in § 280A includes property such as
home, boat, apartment, mobile home, condominium, or any similar property or structures con-
nected with such property).
104. See supra note 102 (Congress enacted § 280A to avoid difficult profit motive deter-
mination regarding rental of residence that taxpayers also use as personal residence during year).
105. See I.R.C. § 280A(d) (West 1984). If a taxpayer uses a dwelling unit either more than
14 days in a year, or at least 10% of the number of days during the year that the taxpayer rents
the unit, whichever is greater, § 280A applies to the maintenance and depreciation deductions.
Id.; see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (§ 280A(c)(5) limits deductions taxpayer may
claim for rental of vacation home to rental income less deductions attributable to home regardless
of whether taxpayer rented home). If § 280A does not apply to the rental of a dwelling, a tax-
payer still must prove that he rented the dwelling with the intent to make a profit in order to
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tions for the time that the taxpayer rented the unit." 6 However, the rental
deductions cannot exceed the gross income that the taxpayer receives from
the rental of the unit less the nonprofit-related deductions, such as interest
or property tax deductions, that the taxpayer may claim for the unit without
regard to whether the taxpayer rented the unit.' 7 The effect of the section
280A limit on rental deductions is, like section 183, to prevent a taxpayer
from claiming deductions in excess of the rental income to shelter other items
of income.0 8 Congress, however, determined that the section 280A limitation
on rental deductions may work unnecessary hardships on taxpayers by prevent-
ing taxpayers from taking rental deductions, even though the taxpayers
legitimately try to convert their residences into income-producing property but
are unable to secure a tenant or are unable to rent their residences at a profit.0 9
Consequently, Congress amended section 280A in 1978 with section 280A(d)(4)
which specifically excludes rental of a residence from the limitations of sec-
tion 280A if the taxpayer rents the residence for a qualified rental period,"
and the residence is also the taxpayer's principal residence under section 1034."'
A qualified rental period includes the fair market rental of a principal residence
prior to sale."I2 Thus, section 280A(d)(4) shows that Congress intended tax-
payers to be able to take full advantage of section 212 and 167 rental deduc-
tions, in excess of the rental income received, for the rental of a principal
avoid the § 183 limitation on deductions for activities that a taxpayer does not engage in for
profit. See JOINT COMAT. ON TAXATION, supra note 102, at 156 (§ 183 applies to nonprofit rental
of vacation home if § 280A does not apply to rental); supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text
(§ 183 limitation on deductions for activities that taxpayer does not engage in for profit).
106. See I.R.C. § 280A(e)(1) (West 1984) (taxpayer may claim as deduction for rental of
dwelling portion of total expenses equivalent to rental portion of total time taxpayer rented or
used dwelling); see also Bolton v. Commissioner 694 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1982) (taxpayer
could allocate as rental expense 75% of total maintenance expenses for residence when time tax-
payer rented residence was 75% of total time taxpayer used or rented residence).
107. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) (West 1984). Congress stated that courts should decide the deduc-
tions allowable for rental activity under § 280A(c)(5) using the same procedure established in
the regulations to § 183. JOINT CoMaM. ON TAXATION, supra note 102, at 156; see supra note 43
(§ 183 procedure for limiting deductions for activity that taxpayer does not engage in for profit).
108. See BrrTKER, supra note 47, at 22.6.4 (§ 280A(c)(5) limits overall rental deductions
to gross rental income that taxpayer receives); supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (§ 183
limits deductions for activity that taxpayer did not engage in for profit to income taxpayer received
from activity).
109. See JOINT Cota. ON TAXATION, GEN A. EXPLANATION OF THE REVENuE ACT OF 1978,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 346-47 (1979) (taxpayer's personal use of principal residence during year
should not prevent taxpayer from claiming deductions for part of year that taxpayer rented
residence); BITTKER, supra note 47, at 22.6.4 (Congress amended § 280A to relieve injustice
of applying § 280A limitations to taxpayers who try to convert residential property into rental
property).
110. I.R.C. § 280A(d)(4)(B) (West 1984). A qualified rental period under § 280A is a period
of 12 or more consecutive months that begins or ends in the taxable year in which the taxpayer
sells or exchanges the residence, or a period of less than 12 months that begins in the year the
taxpayer sells the residence provided the taxpayer rents the residence or holds the residence for
a fair rental. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 110 (definition of qualified rental period under § 280A(d)(4)(3)).
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residence prior to sale and still qualify for section 1034 rollover. 1 3 However,
by holding that section 183 necessarily applies to presale rental activity if sec-
tion 1034 applies to the sale, the Bolaris court effectively negates the tax
advantage section 280A(d)(4) provides because section 183, like section 280A,
prevents the taxpayer from deducting any loss from the rental activity in excess
of income from the activity.'"4 In contrast, section 280A(d)(4) implies that
if section 1034 applies to the sale of a residence, section 183 should not limit
automatically any rental deductions if the taxpayer rented the residence prior
to sale."-'
Although by virtue of section 280A(d)(4), section 280A limitations do not
apply to the rental of a principal residence for a qualified rental period, to
preclude application of section 183 a taxpayer still must show that the rental
was a profit-producing activity." 6 Since sections 212 and 1034 are not mutually
exclusive, the temporary rental distinction under section 1034 should not affect
resolution of whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit for pur-
poses of section 212 or 183."11 Consequently, the Bolaris court had no justifica-
tion to overturn the general rule that the rental of a residence for fair market
value is an activity that a taxpayer engages in for profit and not subject to
the limitations of section 183." Since the Bolarises rented the residence at
its fair market value, the Bolaris court should not have limited the Bolarises
to those deductions section 183 permits but rather should have allowed the
Bolarises to claim all the deductions arising from the rental of the residence
prior to sale."19
Moreover, the Bolaris court's application of the Clapham ancillary to sale
rationale to the Bolarises' rental activity is not sound because it may lead to
inconsistencies under the IRC.'20 In Bolaris, the taxpayers rented their former
residence at a loss for purposes of section 183 because the rental income did
113. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12 (Congress amended § 280A to allow tax-
payer to claim rental deductions in excess of rental income received if taxpayer rented his prin-
cipal residence for qualified rental period).
114. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (Bolaris court held § 183 applies to rental
of principal residence prior to sale if § 1034 applies to gain realized from sale); supra notes 110-12
(Congress amended § 280A to allow taxpayer to take rental deductions in excess of rental income
if taxpayer rents principal residence for qualified rental period).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114 (Bolaris holding negates congressional intent
to allow taxpayers to claim rental deductions in excess of rental income with respect of principal
residence for qualified rental period).
116. See I,R.C. § 280A(a) (West 1984) (taxpayers may claim rental deductions that § 280A
does not provide only pursuant to other IRC provisions).
117. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 853-55 (1983) (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (tem-
porary rental distinction under § 1034 should not affect application of §§ 212 or 183 to rental
activity).
118. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (rental of residence at fair market value is
activity taxpayer engages in for profit).
119. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 855 (1983) (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (taxpayer
in Bolaris should have received all claimed rental deductions).
120. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (rental of two residences at fair market
value ancillary to sales efforts could receive different treatment under § 183).
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not exceed the deductions allowable for the residence regardless of whether
the Bolarises rented the residence for profit.12 ' Accordingly, the Bolarises could
not claim the section 183(d) presumption that an activity is a profit activity
if the taxpayer receives income from the activity in excess of the nonprofit-
related deductions for the activity.'2 2 However, if a taxpayer renting his former
residence prior to sale receives rental income in excess of the deductions other-
wise allowable, then the taxpayer could claim the section 183(d) presumption
that the taxpayer engaged in the activity for profit and accordingly the IRS
would bear the burden of proving the taxpayer did not rent the residence for
a profit.'23 If a taxpayer who rented his residence prior to a sale at its fair
market value could claim the section 183(d) presumption, then the IRS would
have difficulty showing that the taxpayer did not rent the residence to make
a profit. 24 Furthermore, if a taxpayer can show taxable income remaining
from the presale rental income after the taxpayer takes all of the rental deduc-
tions, the IRS probably would not be able to convince a court to apply section
183 to the presale rental activity.'25 Quite possibly, the rental of two residences
ancillary to sale and at a fair market value would receive different treatment
under section 183 depending on whether the activity actually produced a
profit.'26 Yet the section 183 profit test concerns whether a taxpayer had the
honest objective of making a profit rather than whether the taxpayer actually
121. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (Bolarises' gross income from rental of residence
did not exceed deductions Bolarises could have claimed for residence regardless of whether they
rented residence for profit).
122. See I.R.C. § 183(d) (West 1984); supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (section
183(d) presumption that taxpayer engaged in activity for profit).
123. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (§ 183(d) presumption that taxpayer engaged
in activity for profit).
124. See supra text accompanying note 40 (IRS bears burden of proving that taxpayer did
not engage in activity for profit when taxpayer meets § 183(d) presumption that taxpayer engaged
in activity for profit); see also Lipton, supra note 25, at 171-72 (Lipton created hypothetical
situation in which rental of identical residences would receive different treatment under § 183).
In Lipton's hypothetical situation, two taxpayers live next door to each other in identical residences.
Id. at 172. At the same time, each taxpayer vacates and attempts to sell his residence. Id. The
taxpayers are unable to sell their respective residences, so they begin renting the residences for
the same fair market rental. Id. Taxpayer A has rental income remaining after he subtracts both
nonprofit and profit-related deductions from the gross rental income because taxpayer A has
low interest payments to make on his residence. Id. at 171-72. Taxpayer B, however, has no
rental income remaining after he subtracts nonprofit-related expenses from the gross rental income
because Taxpayer B has high interest payments to make on his residence. Id. at 172. Accordingly,
taxpayer B is renting at a loss. Id. Lipton contends that the IRS will not be able to argue suc-
cessfully that § 183 applies to taxpayer A's rental because taxpayer A not only met the § 183(d)
presumption that he engaged in the activity for profit but also showed a taxable profit from
the rental. Id. Lipton maintains, however, that the IRS will apply § 183 to limit taxpayer B's
rental deductions because taxpayer B rented at a loss and could not claim the § 183(d) presump-
tion that he engaged in the rental for profit. Id. Consequently, Lipton concludes that the fair
market rental of identical residences prior to sale could receive different treatment under § 183. Id.
125. See Lipton, supra note 25, at 172 (IRS probably could not establish that rental was
not profit-producing activity when rental actually produced profit).
126. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (hypothetical situation in which two iden-
tical residences rented for same amount receive different treatment under § 183 because differing
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produced a profit.' The inconsistent treatment under section 183 of the same
activity underscores the conclusion that the temporary rental distinction under
section 1034 should not apply to sections 212 or 183.
Since the temporary rental exception for applying section 1034 rollover
to the gain realized from the sale of a principal residence that a taxpayer rented
prior to sale should not affect determination of whether the presale rental
was a profit-producing activity, the Bolaris court should have allowed the
Bolarises' claimed rental deductions under sections 212 and 167 for the fair
market rental of their principal residence prior to sale.' 28 Ordinarily, the fair
market rental of a residence entitles a taxpayer to deductions for expenses
attributable to the rental.' 29 The Bolaris court, however, bypassed the fair
rental rule by applying the Clapham ancillary to sale rationale for determin-
ing when a presale rental is a temporary rental under section 1034 to the ques-
tion of whether the Bolarises engaged in the presale rental for profit. 3 ' The
Clapham case, however, did not concern the issue of rental deductions for
a presale rental, but only concerned whether the Claphams' presale rental
precluded application of section 1034 to the gain realized from the sale of
the Claphams' old residence.' 31 The effect of Bolaris is to render section 183
applicable to the presale rental of a residence, thereby limiting the rental deduc-
tions to the income the taxpayer receives from the presale rental, whenever
section 1034 applies to the sale of a residence.' 32 Yet by enacting section
280A(d)(4) of the IRC, which excludes the presale rental of a principal residence
at fair market value from the limitations of section 280A, Congress implied
that taxpayers should be able to claim rental deductions in excess of rental
income for the rental of a principal residence prior to sale. 33 Moreover, the
mortgage interest rates allow one residence to meet § 183 presumption).
127. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (taxpayer engaged in activity for profit
for purposes of § 183 if taxpayer engaged in activity with honest objective of making profit).
128. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 853-55 (1983) (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (fact
that taxpayer's fair market rental of residence was ancillary to taxpayer's sales efforts for residence
should not prevent taxpayer from claiming rental deductions).
129. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (courts generally view fair market rental of
residence as activity taxpayer engages in for profit).
130. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 847-50 (1983) (taxpayer's rental of residence
ancillary to sales efforts was not activity taxpayer engaged in for profit); supra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text (Bolaris court applied Clapham ancillary to sale rationale to Bolarises' rental
activity); supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (Clapham court's analysis that rental ancillary
to sale is temporary rental for purposes of § 1034).
131. See supra notes 95 and accompanying text (sole issue in Clapham was whether Claphams'
rental activity precluded application of § 1034 to gain realized from sale of Claphams' residence).
132. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 850 (as general proposition rental of prin-
cipal residence ancillary to sale is not activity taxpayer engages in for profit).
133. See I.R.C. § 280A(d)(4) (West 1983) (limitations of § 280A shall not apply to taxpayer
who rents his principal residence for qualified rental period); supra note 110 and accompanying
text (qualified rental period includes rental of principal residence prior to sale); supra note 106-08
and accompanying text (§ 280A limits amount of rental deductions taxpayers may claim for dwelling
taxpayer both rented and occupied during year to gross rental income received from rental).
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Bolaris rationale calling for section 183 treatment of the presale rental of a
residence when section 1034 applies to the sale may lead to inconsistent results
under the IRC if a taxpayer actually produces a profit from a presale rental.'3
Consequently, the Tax Court should reconsider Bolaris and allow taxpayers
rental deductions for the presale rental of a principal residence at fair market
value.'"
JOHN CALHOUN MORROW
134. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text (presale rental of two identical residences
at fair market value could receive different treatment under § 183 depending on whether rental
produced profit).
135. See Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 855 (1983) (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (tax-
payers in Bolaris should receive full amount of rental deductions claimed under §§ 212 and 167).
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